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Introduction
On the night of October 16, 2017, Iraqi military units operating in coordi-
nation with the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) attacked the city of
Kirkuk. The town had been in the hands of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga
since 2014, when the Iraqi national army forces failed to protect the city
from advancing Islamic State terrorists.1 In the face of advancing Iraqi
troops and PMF, most of the troops affiliated with the dominant
Kurdish party in the area, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),
retreated without engaging in a major clash.2
Afterwards, two competing narratives emerged. On the one hand, a
number of prominent officials described the PUK withdrawal as a
national betrayal. Masoud Barzani, who was President of the Kurdistan
Region at the time, released a statement following the withdrawal claim-
ing that members of a specific political party unilaterally aided the Iraqi
advance on Kirkuk. He said that “some people from a certain political
party (PUK) had unilaterally paved the way for such an attack whose
result was the withdrawal of the Peshmerga forces from Kirkuk.”3
Others argued that the retreat was militarily prudent and prevented need-
less bloodshed. While it is politically advantageous to create binary nar-
ratives, the question that needs to be answered is whether it was it
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essential for the forces of the PUK to defend Kirkuk and the disputed ter-
ritories at all? To find a balanced answer, this article, based on interviews
with the Kurdish authorities and military commanders, will critically
examine both the KDP and the PUK’s answers and see how the different
narratives stand in the face of this evidence. The article also discusses the
consequences of the retreat from Kirkuk and how the events immediately
after the referendum deepened divisions in Kurdish politics.
Independence Referendum: Regional and International
Environment
The Kurdistan Region consists of the three northern governorates of the
Republic of Iraq. It is home to nearly six million Kurds, Turkmen,
Arabs, and various religious and ethnic minorities. However, Kurds
also lay claim to a number of ethnically mixed districts outside the
boundaries of those governorates, particularly in Nineveh, Saladin,
Kirkuk, and Diyala provinces to the south and west. These are popularly
known as the “disputed areas.” Under Article 140 of the Iraqi consti-
tution, control of these areas would be decided after taking a census
of the local population, which would then be followed by a referendum.
The original intention was that this process would take place before
December 31, 2007. However, the Iraqi government has not yet
implemented the process outlined in the constitution. Compounding
the problem of the disputed area is that, at the time of the Kurdistan
independence referendum, those areas were under the military control
of Kurdish Peshmerga forces. In 2014, the Iraqi government had
ceded large swathes of territory to Islamic State (ISIS). Over the follow-
ing three years, as the so-called caliphate suffered military setbacks,
Kurdish forces extended their control over the disputed areas as they
fought back against the militants.
On September 25, 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
unilaterally held a referendum on the question of whether to declare
independence from Iraq. The election was conducted in the three gover-
norates of the Kurdistan Region, as well as the disputed areas. 92% of
Iraqi Kurds supported secession. However, the vote was strongly
opposed by Turkmen and Arab groups in Kirkuk, and the Iraqi govern-
ment in Baghdad was concerned for reasons of territorial integrity and
oil resources, that the referendum would consolidate Kurdish control
over the disputed areas that had been retaken from ISIS. Iraqi Prime
Minister Haidar al-Abadi said that his country was ready to intervene
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militarily if the referendum caused violence or destabilised the country
in an interview with the Associated Press, saying that “he would resort
to force if necessary to protect our population”.4 The Iraqi parliament
also voted to reject the Kurdish Independence Referendum, and
approved a motion which stated “This referendum lacks a constitutional
basis and thus it is considered unconstitutional,” without specifying
what measures the central government would take.5 The Supreme
Federal Court of Iraq, which is the highest judicial authority in the
country, issued a mandate to stop the proceedings of the referendum,
asserting that both holding the referendum and whatever result came
to pass were both unconstitutional. The ruling came nearly two
months after the vote, and will have a bearing on any future moves
towards independence launched by the KRG.
At a party level, most of the Iraqi parties, especially the ones represent-
ing Iraq’s majority Shi’ites, warned the Kurds that, if they went forward
with the referendum, it would give them the justification that they
needed to launch an offensive to retake the disputed areas. For
example, Qais al-Khazali, the head of the Iran-funded Asa’ib Ahlal-
Haq militia, told a meeting of PUK members of parliament said that
“on the night of [September 25, 2017], he did not sleep and spent the
whole night in prayer to God for the Kurds not to delay their referen-
dum, so that we will have the justification to attack Kirkuk”6, which
is what subsequently happened.
Barzani might have had three motivations for holding the referendum in
the Kurdistan Region and the disputed territories. To begin with, at a per-
sonal level, Barzani had his own motivation for ensuring that a referen-
dum took place and that it would be held in the disputed areas. For
Barzani, the achievement would enable him to continue not only as a
legitimate president, but also as a nationalist leader. His legitimacy was
increasingly coming into question prior to 2017, with his authority
based on shaky legal grounds. In August 2015, Barzani’s term expired,
but he refused to step down from his position and, on October 12,
2015, his security forces prevented the Speaker of the Kurdistan Parlia-
ment Yusuf Muhammad from entering Erbil to hold a session on
whether to amend the presidential law. Following this incident, Gorran
Movement ministers were expelled from the government by the KDP
and were replaced with KDP members. While Barzani was still in
power, the legitimacy of his power was increasingly viewed as illegiti-
mate. The success of the referendum process in Kirkuk and the protection
of the province was intended to entrench both the KDP power and its
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leader in the Kurdistan Region against its rivals, enabling a resolution of
his constitutional predicament that suited the KDP.7 Next, from the party
perspective, many viewed Barzani and the KDP’s push for the vote as a
means to consolidate domestic power at the expense of their political
opponents. Finally, at the national level, Barzani viewed the period of
late-2017 as an appropriate moment to exchange international goodwill
for increased sovereignty, and to solidify Kurdish territorial gains made
from fighting the Islamic State.
The Situation of Kirkuk before the Referendum
Kirkuk, the largest city in the disputed territories, is often described as
“Little Iraq” as it reflects the country’s diverse communities and tensions
between them. The city’s population is a mix of Kurd, Arab, and
Turkmen, each ascribing special significance to the city: the Kurds call
it the “Kurdish Jerusalem”, Arabs claim that it is “a small Iraq” and an
Arab city, and Turkmens view it as the capital of the Turkmen, their pro-
spective homeland.8
While ethnic tensions in the city have a long history, the decision by
Kurdish authorities to include the oil-rich province in the independence
referendum sparked renewed tensions. The fact that Peshmerga had
come to control the disputed areas during the fight against ISIS
allowed Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani to controversially and unilater-
ally claim in July 2014 that “Article 140 of the constitution has been
implemented and completed for us.”9 He added that the Kurds had
been patient for more than a decade, waiting for Baghdad to address
the issue and that a resolution did not seem to be forthcoming. From
Baghdad’s perspective, if Kirkuk remained under Kurdish control for
an indefinite period, it would strengthen KRG at the expense of the
central Iraqi state that had been weakened and embarrassed by ISIS’s
offensive that summer.
Compounding the issue of historic ethnic tensions is the fact that parts of
the disputed areas are extraordinarily rich in oil and natural gas. Kirkuk,
for instance, has a great economic importance; it is famous for oil pro-
duction and includes about 40% of Iraq’s oil in six oil fields, the
largest being in the city of Kirkuk itself. Its oil is exported through the
northern oil pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. It also contains
70% natural gas produced by Iraq. For decades, successive Arab-led gov-
ernments in Baghdad sought to control the area’s oil wealth and
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downplay its identity as a centre of Turkmen and Kurdish culture. From
the 1960s until the Ba’ath Regime’s fall, the government resorted to ever
more extreme methods of violence and ethnic displacement (Arabiza-
tion). The Iraqi government has sought to control Kirkuk’s oil wealth
since the nation’s inception in 1925, and successive Arab-led govern-
ments downplayed Kirkuk’s identity as a centre of Kurdish culture.10
According to Shwan Daoudi, Iraqi MP of Kirkuk for the PUK, during
the period when the Peshmerga was in control of the disputed areas,
there is a great deal of evidence that the Kurdish political parties,
mainly the PUK and the KDP, treated the Arab and Turkmen popu-
lations with hostility and marginalised their voices. For more than
four years, Kurds had controlled the security apparatus and municipal
administration, and did so without the input of and at the expense of
the other ethnic groups.11 In November 2016, Amnesty International
released a damning report claiming that Kurdish forces had carried
out a wave of attacks against the local Arab population, demolishing
their homes and expelling hundreds of people from the city, in apparent
revenge for an attack carried out by the Islamic State on October 21,
2016.12 Human Rights Watch also investigated the allegations and con-
firmed that the Kurdish authorities had expelled Arab residents and dis-
placed persons. It reported incidents where, after expelling ISIS
militants from villages in the province, that houses of some local resi-
dents were set on fire and others were destroyed using heavy equipment
by the Peshmerga and other Kurdish groups.13
The Kurds ruled Kirkuk using the logic of opportunism. On August 25,
2017, Najmiddin Karim, the Kurdish Governor of Kirkuk province,
officially called on the Provincial Council to vote in favour of
holding a referendum in the city. In a session boycotted by Turkmen
and Arab members, Kirkuk’s provincial council approved the governor-
ate’s participation in the independence referendum of the Kurdistan
region.14 In response, Turkmen political parties in Kirkuk urged the
people of the city to boycott the vote and said that they would not recog-
nise the result,15 insisting that the referendum violated the Iraqi consti-
tution and warning that the move could develop into a sectarian war.
Similarly, the city’s Arabs viewed the decision to hold the Kurdish inde-
pendence referendum in the city at all as an illegitimate move to pre-
emptively decide Kirkuk’s future.16 Taken as a whole, the Kurdish
approach to governance in the disputed areas before the referendum
had inflamed pre-existing tensions with people who would be directly
impacted by the decision.
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While local ethnic minorities were opposed to secession, there was no
consensus of opinion among Kurds on the referendum either, especially
in terms of whether the referendum should extend to the disputed areas.
The Kurdistan Parliament in Erbil had been forcibly dissolved in 2015,
but convened a few days in advance of the momentous occasion of the
vote. Forty-three members of parliament from the Gorran Movement,
Komal Group, and the PUK, most of whom hailed from Sulaymaniyah
governorate, refused to participate in what they considered to be an
illegal session with the sole purpose of legitimising an “unlawful referen-
dum” and boycotted the meeting. Meanwhile, the PUK Politburo and
office in Kirkuk held back from the decision to hold the referendum in
the city, which was significant because of the local strength of the
party in the province; before the referendum, they held six parliamentary
seats out of a total of 13 seats allocated to the province. Many within the
party had cautioned against the vote, saying that adequate legal frame-
works or administrative plans had not been produced beforehand. On
September 14, the local party Malband, or office, put out a statement
saying: “we have decided not to be part of the referendum and reject
holding it in the city” and called for dialogue between the various
groups in the city. However, the first Deputy Secretary-General of the
PUK, Kosrat Rasul, and his faction within the party were successful in
making sure that the referendum would be held in the city.
In the aftermath of the referendum and the loss of the city Shwan Daoudi,
Rebwar Taha, Iraqi MPs of Kirkuk for PUK and Aso Mamand, leader of
the PUK in Kirkuk blamed politicians, such as Masoud Barzani, Kosrat
Rasul, and Najmiddin Karim, for ignoring local concerns and imposing
a compulsory decision on Kirkuk without adequately anticipating the
reaction that it would produce. For instance, the member of political
bureau and leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Kirkuk Aso
Mamand said that: “I was promised by Masoud Barzani, Nechirvan
Barzani, Kosrat Rasul, Mala Bakhtiar, and Najmiddin Karimthat they
would exclude Kirkuk from participation in the referendum, but they
lied to me”.17 As reflected by the results of the vote, the decision to
hold the referendum was popular among ordinary Kurds in Kirkuk, but
the public cannot always calculate costs and benefits accurately,
especially after being inculcated by nationalist discourse. The leaders
and organs of the PUK in Kirkuk realised the high-level of risk that
they were incurring by unilaterally holding the referendum in the city,
but they were ultimately powerless to prevent it because of to the strength
of party voices elsewhere in the party.
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Kurdish Partisan Forces and the Role of Partisan and Personal
Loyalties
In analysing the criticisms levelled at the PUK in the aftermath of the
withdrawal from Kirkuk, it is critical to understand the partisan divide
of the Kurdish forces, and how this characteristic ensures that any military
manoeuvre will elicit a partisan reaction.
The Peshmerga has its historical antecedents in the armed groups associ-
ated with the two main parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, the KDP and PUK, who
themselves were founded as resistance movements against the Iraqi state.
Under the current Iraqi constitution and the Kurdistan Region’s own
laws, all Kurdish forces must be officially subordinated to the control
of the KRG Presidency Council and the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.
Theoretically, this would result in a unified, non-partisan force that acts
as the regional guard force. In practice, however, the two parties
control the affairs in the zones where they are dominant without much
interference, with the KDP running affairs in Duhok and Erbil provinces
and the PUK in Sulaimaniyah and Halabja. Nowhere is this division more
clear than in the command and control structures of the Peshmerga. Cur-
rently, there are fourteen brigades that amount to roughly 40,000 Pesh-
merga personnel which are under the control of the Ministry of
Peshmerga Affairs. However, the ruling duopoly has around three
times as many Peshmerga under their direct control and, moreover, it
wields considerable influence over the ministry-affiliated units as well.
The KDP’s 80 Brigade is the best funded and equipped force in that
party’s zone of control in the northwest, while the PUK 70 Brigade
plays the same role in the southeast.18
As will be discussed later, it is this divide that ultimately precipitates the
political controversy of whether the PUK’s Peshmerga units should have
withdrawn from Kirkuk. Even to interested partisans, a divided regional
guard force presents obvious political and command and control chal-
lenges and, as a result, there have been a number of efforts to unify the
Kurdish forces. After waging separate guerrilla wars against the Iraqi
regime in the 1970s and 1980s, the two sides formally agreed in 1992
to unite their separate forces and subordinate them under the authority
of a dedicated Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. The eruption of a bloody
Kurdish civil war in 1994 paralysed the unification process for several
years. The process ostensibly resumed in 1998, but little has been accom-
plished beyond one or two symbolic gestures.
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Any tactical or strategic decision can be criticised on military grounds,
but the personal loyalties and party divides in the Kurdish Peshmerga
ensure that any decision will necessarily have a partisan or political
element to it. The best example of this before the PUK’s withdrawal
from Kirkuk was the retreat of forces loyal to the KDP Sinjar city on
August 3, 2014, which allowed the Islamic State to commit genocide
against the Yazidi people. This decision was made without informing
the Minster of Peshmerga Affairs. Mustafa Saed Kader, who has said
that he was not notified of the withdrawal in advance. “I knew what
any regular person would find out from the media,” recalled Mustafa
Qadir during an interview.19 Halo Penjweni, a member of PUK leader-
ship council and the supervisor of the Nineveh Branch for the party,
said that the KDP’s forces made that decision completely on its own
and did not ask for support from PUK units.20 These statements by
PUK officials stand as preface for similar statements made by KDP and
other pro-independence politicians three years later.
The Iraqi Attack on Kirkuk and its Aftermath
Once the KRG had gone forward with the independence referendum,
Baghdad announced that they would redeploy their forces to areas that
had been under Iraqi control before the rise of ISIS in June 2014,
giving the Kurdish forces an ultimatum either to withdraw or be attacked.
On October 12, the Shi’a paramilitary PMF began demanding that
the Peshmerga vacate all military bases in Kirkuk province within two
hours of the announcement.21 In the same day, a column of Iraqi
regular army, Special Forces, and PMF units affiliated with Grand Aya-
tollah Ali al-Sistani advanced northwards toward the Kurdish frontline in
Kirkuk city. Local Peshmerga reportedly came very close to firing on the
column, but a last-minute intervention in the form of a phone call from a
PUK faction to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi prevented any
bloodshed at that juncture.
In the call, the faction asked for forty-eight hours to confer internally and
with the KDP about how to proceed. Jaafar Sheikh Mustafa, commander
of PUK’s 70 Brigade, said during a press conference on October 13:
we departed from some points that we cannot defend, after taking orders from the
General Command of Peshmerga forces to pull out from those points. However, we
have studied the plans for fighting too and the Peshmerga forces are in some strong
points that can keep Kirkuk safe.
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In the same press conference, Wasta Rasool, a PUK Peshmerga comman-
der in southern Kirkuk said: “we will remain in our positions and ready to
fight…we hope that they will come… I only tell them that we hope they
will come”. Similarly, Hemn Hawrami a senior assistant to Masoud
Barzani and KDP Leadership Council member “vowed the Peshmerga
would defend their positions, thousands of heavily armed Peshmerga
units are now completely in their positions around Kirkuk, their order
is to defend at any cost.”22
The following day, while Peshmerga commanders claimed that the Iraqi
forces were preparing to attack the Peshmerga-controlled areas with
foreign encouragement and backing, they also promised to defend the
city. For instance, Rasool told Kurdish media that: “Big masses of forces,
with big fire [weapons], does not mean good will, or send a good
gesture. This force has been deployed and they have said themselves,
they say so in public, that we want to enter Kirkuk”. Similarly, Jaafar
said that “we do not want war, but if they attack, we will defend ourselves
and you will see who will be defeated”. Similarly, Kamal Kirkuki said that:
“as Peshmerga we announced that if they come toward our frontlines we
will break their nose and defeat them… if they do dare, they will come;
we will teach them a lesson never had been taught that lesson”. Despite
these defiant notes, it appears that preparations were also being made by
some units for a retreat, with one Peshmerga officer in southwest Kirkuk
later saying that his unit began to withdraw on 14 October after receiving
orders to from a superior.23 With Kurdish and Iraqi forces engaged
in a tense standoff south of Kirkuk city, Kurdish officials held a meeting
in the town of Dukan on 15 October. The KDP and PUK officially rejected
Iraqi demands to nullify the results of the referendum and warned that use of
military force by Baghdad to take over the disputed areas would not resolve
disagreements between Erbil and Baghdad.
Iraqi forces attacked the Kurdish lines south and west of Kirkuk city start-
ing at midnight on Sunday, 16 October 2017. In addition to Iraqi regular
army units, the U.S.-trained Counter Terrorism Service and Iranian-
backed PMF participated in the offensive, which reinforced the sense
of many Kurds that they stood opposed to the rest of the world in fighting
for their rights.24 Armed civilians took to the streets of Kirkuk, vowing to
defend their land. When Iraqi forces entered the city of Kirkuk, Prime
Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered Iraqi forces to remove Kurdish flags
that they encountered in the disputed areas and leave only Iraqi ones.
The PUK and Kirkuk MP Shawan Daoudi said a battle plan had not
been developed by Kurdish leaders because, even as late as the Dukan
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meeting, they did not take Iraqi warnings and threats seriously and
believed that the Iraqi government was bluffing.25
Once Iraqi forces had solidified their hold on Kirkuk and the other dis-
puted areas in the days following 16 October 2017, Kurdish officials
started trading the blame for the loss of the disputed areas. Masoud
Barzani issued a statement that predictably criticised members of the
PUK, saying that their actions “unilaterally paved the way for the
attack”. Within the PUK, serious divisions within the party’s ranks
were laid bare.
Similarly, Najmiddin Karim, former governor of Kirkuk, said that: “Iran
finally found the division within the PUK and convinced the largest
faction of PUK to withdraw from the area without fighting”.26 Kosrat
Rasul, the PUK leader who had ensured that the referendum would be
held in Kirkuk, fiercely denounced those in his own party who had
ordered the withdrawal of the Peshmerga. Others, like General Ayub
Youssef, took issue with the fact that there was little cooperation
between the PUK and the KDP.27 Mustafa Saed Kader claimed that:
“if we had a united Kurdish force, instead of partisan forces, we would
have better performance against the Iraqi armed forces”.28 The most
serious charges, however, were that there had been collusion between
PUK leaders and Iraqi and Iranian officials to avoid a fight. According
to Najmiddin Karim on October 15, some PUK commanders including
Wasta Rasul and General Mariwan, a Peshmerga commander of PUK
forces met with Iranian representative Aqa Eiqbal-Pur and PMF leader
Hadi Al-Ameri to negotiate a unilateral withdrawal of PUK Peshmerga.29
PUK members of parliament denied this, insisting that no agreement was
reached because of opposition from some parties.
Najmiddin Karim states that in the aftermath of the battle, Kurdish influ-
ence in the city was significantly eroded, despite the fact that ethnic Kurds
still made up a large part of the population. Ethnic Arabs, who had fled
the city either during the ISIS offensive or during the period of
Kurdish rule, returned to Kirkuk again after the events of 16 October.
Some Kurdish leaders lamented that the capture of Kirkuk by the
central government forced many Kurds to leave and enabled some
Arab families to appropriate Kurdish properties and agricultural fields.
Shwan Daoudi said that, at an administrative level, many of the
Kurdish officials who had held offices in the city before the referendum
were removed and replaced by non-Kurds. As a result, the loss of Kirkuk
and the disputed areas was a severe political and military blow to the
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Kurds and ensured that the independence referendum had well and truly
failed to produce the intended outcome. Counterintuitively, it laid bare
critical divisions at the precise moment that Kurds might have appeared
to be most united, after an overwhelming decisive vote for independence.
“The PUK should have Defended Kirkuk and not Withdrawn”
Of the two narratives that have developed in the aftermath of October 16,
the argument that the PUK should have strongly defended Kirkuk and the
disputed areas is advanced most often by those who also said that the
Kurds were right to hold the referendum in Kirkuk. Supporters of this
line of thinking tend to argue that some members of the PUK betrayed
the Kurdish nation by colluding with foreign powers to undermine the
results of the referendum. Holders of this view also tend to believe that
the loss of Kirkuk and the disputed territories was the primary reason
why the result of the Kurdish independence referendum was not
respected; had the Peshmerga stood and successfully defended the city,
Baghdad and foreign governments would have been forced to recognise
Kurdish independence. Advocates of this viewpoint believe that the inter-
national community would not have tolerated the slaughter of a Kurdish
population by the Iraqi central government or neighbouring states, preci-
pitating an international intervention like in Kobane 2014 or Operation
Provide Comfort in 1991.
Additionally, supporters of a staunch defence of Kirkuk argue that inter-
national powers, in particular the United States, would have seen fighting
between Erbil and Baghdad as an intolerable distraction from the fight
against Islamic State and would have sided with the Kurds. Among the
proponents of this narrative are Najmiddin Karim of the PUK and
Masoud Barzani of the KDP, both of whom were strong supporters of
the referendum despite being from rival parties.
Even before the referendum had occurred, Karim had argued that: “if the
Peshmerga forces fought for twenty-four hours, the situation would
change and the United States would interfere”.30 In response to the
debacle, Barzani decided to resign.31 This argument restsfirst and foremost
on the explicit right of Kurds to Kirkuk, but also on the ironic turn that the
hoped for intervention by foreign powers was insidious rather than heroic.
While it is understandable why some Kurdish leaders made this argu-
ment, its premise does not hold up because of several delusional
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misinterpretations. First, the United States has long supported a unified
Iraq and has prioritised other regional considerations above the political
desires of its Kurdish allies, as White House spokesperson Sarah Huck-
abee Sanders said quite explicitly on September 25, 2017: “We hope
for a unified Iraq to annihilate ISIS and certainly a unified Iraq to push
back on Iran”.32 Trump himself announced on 16 October 2017 that the
United States “[chooses] to be neutral in the dispute between Erbil and
Baghdad. [It…] also chooses not to take sides in the clashes between
the two sides”.33
Moreover, according to Masoud Barzani, the Iraqi Army offensive into
the disputed areas was approved by the United States and the United
Kingdom, saying: “We do believe that the Iraqi plan has the US approval
to enter Kirkuk and other Kurdish-held areas” and that “the operation to
take over Kirkuk was led by the Iranians with the knowledge of U.S. and
British officials”.34 Thus, the Kurdish leaders were wrong in their calcu-
lation of expecting US military support. Second, had the United States
engaged militarily in the dispute, their interests would have dictated
that it side with the Iraqi government, rather than the Kurds, given the
regional and economic role played by Baghdad and, in doing so, would
have reaffirmed the status quo.
While it is unusual to find the US and Iran on the same side of an issue,
the latter also opposed Kurdish secessionism, describing the referendum
as a red line. The second Iranian representative (Deputy Chief of Mission)
in Iraq, Aqa Mzgaian, visited former governor of Kirkuk Najmiddin
Karim in the city and insisted that the Kurds must not hold a referendum,
but that Karim should seek a deadline to implement the Article 140 of
constitution. Similarly, Shwan Daoudi said what was happening in
Kirkuk and Afrin followed an understanding between Ankara and
Tehran. Iran’s belief that an Independent Kurdistan would be a western
orientated ‘second Israel’ and, therefore, a direct security threat against
Iran meant that Iran would have been ready to use all means necessary
to prevent such an outcome. In the same manner as Iran, Turkey also
opposed the Kurdish referendum.
Turkey, with the largest Kurdish minority in the region, has been battling
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in its southeast since 1984. It
warned that the referendum on self-determination in Iraqi Kurdistan
posed a national security threat to Turkey, and threatened the Kurds
that Turkey would take any necessary steps to prevent independence.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a press conference stated
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that Kurdish independence was unacceptable to his country and that this
was a “matter of survival.”
The largest opposition party in Turkey,OzturkYilmaz, called onAnkara to
give Barzani 24 hours to abandon his plans for a referendum on Kurdish
independence or face military, political or economic repercussions.
Yilmaz also claimed that the referendum on the secession of Kurdistan
from Iraqwould seriously destabilise the region and could lead to civil war.
Had the United States backed the poll results and supported the Kurdish
move then another war would undoubtedly have taken hold in the region
and one that was not in the interests of theWest. In short, regional and inter-
national forces, such as Russia, China, and the European Union, were
against the referendum and hence, any intervention by them would have
been to restore stability in Iraq via the re-establishment of the status quo.
However, the counterargument has been advanced that the Kurds would
not need foreign support to declare an independent state or to retain
control over Kirkuk and the other disputed territories. In other words,
advocates of this position argue that if the Kurdish forces fight the
Iraqi forces for long enough, then the United States would step in and
mediate a halt to the fighting, providing an opportunity for the Kurdish
forces to retain de-facto control over the disputed areas.35
Another common reason to defend Kirkuk offered by KDP supporters is
that the Peshmerga forces could have defended the disputed territories
and Kirkuk because of the Peshmerga’s high morale, not to mention
the great bravery it showed on the same ground during the campaign
against ISIS. Aras Shex Jangi, however, claimed that “throughout the
fight against ISIS the Peshmerga forces could not confront the terrorists
independently. Once the air forces of the international coalition had
bombed the terrorist fighters, the Peshmerga forces then [went] to the
area to control the area.”36 Similarly, Peshmerga commander Lywa Ayub
said: “they informed their Kurdish leaders that they could fight against
Iraqi security forces only for two days, no more.” KDP advocates counter
by citing isolated examples of successful resistance, especially by KDP
units around Pirde (Altun Kupri), which they argue could have been emu-
lated elsewhere had it not been for the alleged political deal brokered by the
PUK. For instance, KDP-affiliated news outlet Rudaw reported a statement
by the Kurdistan Regions Security Council saying that a Peshmerga unit in
Pirde had destroyed “one US Abrams tank and a dozen armored vehicles
used by Iraqi Security Forces and Hashd al-Shaabi North of Kirkuk.”37
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“The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was Right to Withdraw and
not make a Stand in Kirkuk”
The contrasting narrative is that the PUK was right, from a military stand-
point, to withdraw from Kirkuk in the face of overwhelming odds and to
avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Furthermore, supporters of this line of
thinking believe that there is a non-military path forward in the future.
Many of the supporters of this narrative were opposed to holding the
referendum in the disputed areas in the first place. Aso Mamand, leader
of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Kirkuk, later said:
we cannot fight against a state that we are a part of: its president is Kurdish, we [also
did not want] to be the cause of the destruction of the city that we have fought for
over decades and paid a lot of sacrifice including thousands of martyrs to control in
the first place.38
Even though he fought against Iraqi forces on 16 October, Ayub Youssef,
the major general of Kosrat Rasoul’s protection brigades, has also
advanced this argument, saying that “withdrawal by PUK was a good
and logical decision, because we share in and are a part of this country
and [fighting] that state is an unconstitutional action. Still we could with-
draw in a very organised way and not let our Peshmerga be killed”.39
Those who advance this narrative mostly focus on arguments of military
practicability, rather than aspirational theories that rely on an ultimately
delusional assumption about the likelihood of intervention.
First, from a numbers standpoint, the Iraqi and Shi’ite militia forces out-
numbered the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and, had the Kurdish troops
engaged the advancing Iraqi forces who were far better armed, the
result would have almost certainly been the fall of Kirkuk with the defen-
ders suffering many causalities. Iraqi forces and PMF together were esti-
mated to include nearly 40,000 fighters, who were well-trained and
equipped with modern weapons that they had received from foreign gov-
ernments to fight ISIS. Furthermore, their morale was high, given their
recent victories against Islamic State. In contrast, Peshmerga forces had
only few of the brigade soldiers in the field and were ill-equipped com-
pared with the Iraqi forces. Ayub Youssef declared that he had officially
warned the Kurdish leadership that they could fight for nearly two weeks,
which, in his estimation was not sufficient time to allow for an interven-
tion and why he believed that coming to an agreement with the Iraqi gov-
ernment was the best choice. Another estimate of how long the
Peshmerga could hold out, according to Shwan Daoudi, was only two
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days. As it was, during two hours fighting with the Iraqi forces, the Pesh-
merga suffered 87 dead, which would have almost certainly been higher if
the PUK had decided to make a prolonged stand.
Taking the intra-Kurdish political balance into consideration, PUK
decision makers believed that a defence of the city would result in
heavy casualties for the armed forces affiliated with the party and lead
to an imbalance with the already more numerous KDP-affiliated forces.
According to Rebwar Taha, the reality for the PUK was that Kirkuk
fell into the party’s sphere of influence and its soldiers would be the
ones fighting and dying to defend it, while the KDP forces would have
been spared the heaviest fighting. Additionally, defending the city of
Kirkuk from the advancing Iraqi army and the Shi’ite militias would
have come with an undesired humanitarian cost. Urban fighting often
results in heavy causalities for attackers, defenders, and the civilian popu-
lation alike. By deciding to make a withdrawal, PUK leaders likely pre-
vented heavy civilian losses, in addition to those of their own forces. The
retreat of the Peshmerga from Kirkuk likely also prevented an outbreak of
ethnic violence between Kurds and Shi’ite Arabs. Aso Mamand, for
instance, has claimed that:
There was a possibility of sectarian civil war, especially once the people of differ-
ent ethnicities came out from their home and chanting against each other. Hence,
the probability of a clash between Kurds and Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs was
higher than at any other time.
To that end, the PUK can credibly claim that its decision to withdraw pre-
vented unnecessary bloodshed.
The loss of Kurdish military control over the city of Kirkuk does not
necessarily mean that Kirkuk is irrecoverably lost, as it remains a constitu-
tionally-designated “disputed area”.40 In fact, the US is currently working
to normalise the status of Kirkuk to its pre-2014 state, by insisting that
Kurdish forces be allowed to return to the city, according to Peshmerga
70th unit commander Shiekh Jaafar Sheikh Mustapha.41 In sum, the
Kurds practically lost those areas to the federal government of Iraq,
but constitutionally those areas are still disputed territories and their
status should be resolved by constitutional means.
Moreover, it was likely that some within the PUK did not view the Iraqi
forces as a foreign force. SaadiAhmed Pira, the spokesman for PUK, coun-
tered accusations of national betrayal by pointing out that the KDP had
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invited Iraqi government tanks into Erbil on August 31, 1996, at a time
both Kurdish parties were actively agitating for the collapse of the Iraqi
government. He further made the argument that the Kurds
are stakeholders in this Iraqi government. We [as Iraqi Kurds] hold the post of Iraqi
President, hold numerous ministerial portfolios and control parliamentary seats in
the country. Iraq’s ForeignMinister is a Kurd, and a KDPmember, the chief of staff
of the Iraqi Army is Kurdish and from KDP.
He went further, saying that “after the Iraqi attack on Kirkuk all of the
Kurdish parties except for the KDP returned to Kirkuk to campaign
and competed in the 2018 Iraqi national elections”. To that end, suppor-
ters of this narrative believe that there is still the possibility that the
Kirkuk issue can still be resolved through non-military means.
For KDP advocates, however, the aforementioned reasons are merely jus-
tifications made by the same PUK leaders who, in their view, sold-out
Kirkuk. They believe that these justifications do not change the fact
that a group from the PUK made what they see as a back-room agreement
with the Iraqi forces and PMF to hand over Kirkuk.42
Consequences of the Withdrawal of Kurdish Forces from the
Disputed Territories without Confrontation
The loss of Kirkuk has had several important consequences. First,
Kurdish forces, in loosing military control of Iraq’s disputed areas, lost
any administrative control that they had held in Kirkuk and elsewhere.
The federal government restored its authority over Kirkuk’s oil fields,
with the KRG thus losing more than 50% of its oil revenue. Practically,
the KRG and the Peshmerga now face an acute financial dilemma in the
short term. In response, the KRG drastically cut the salaries of public
employees, including security personnel. As many civil servants were
already struggling to make ends meet, this is likely to cause further
social unrest. This means that the KRG must either bow to demands
from Baghdad to bring the Peshmerga under central government
control as a quid pro quo for financial support, or that the KRG must
itself initiate substantial downsizing.43
Second, it has led to the weakening of Erbil’s political and military stand-
ing within Iraq. The central government views the Kurds as having come
out of the referendum as politically wounded, and is currently handling
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administrative issues according to that point of view. The Iraqi govern-
ment is no longer dealing with the Kurdistan Region’s issues on the
basis of the constitution, but in ways that are most immediately advan-
tageous to itself.
Third, the withdrawal of the Kurdish forces from the disputed areas has
translated into the loss of internal support for the main Kurdish parties
by the Kurdish polity and by the residents of the disputed territories.
For instance, the people of Kirkuk expected to have their own country
after the independence referendum, but “they are living under a semi-
military rule and facing an Arabization campaign”.44
Fourth, trust between the KDP and PUK is probably at its lowest point
since the Kurdish civil war and the subsequent Washington accords of
the 1990s. The loss of Kirkuk has had an impact on the PUK-KDP
ties, because the KDP did not expect the PUK forces would pull out
without coordination between both sides. Ayub Youssef said that the
PUK’s relationship with the KDP was damaged because
they [the PUK] did not fight for Kirkuk. Kamal Kirkuki commander of the Pesh-
merga on the west Kirkuk front had 5,000 troops in his front, [but] they did not
shoot a single bullet and left the area without fighting. If the KDP Peshmerga
did not evacuate our backyard, the Iraqi forces could not have entered the city
from our front.
The PUK commanders, mainly those who close to the Kosrat Rasoul
faction who fought against Iraqi forces on 16 October not only blame
their political leadership for ordering the withdrawal of Peshmerga
forces in an unorganised way, but they also blame the KDP for betraying
them by withdrawing their forces and evacuating the western Kirkuk
battle front without informing the PUK. As a result, the political relation-
ship between the two parties lacks mutual trust and there is little prospect
that it will be resurrected in the current climate.
Conclusion
The fall of Kirkuk shows that there is a need for a unified armed force in
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The current military arrangement, in which
each party controls a separate and distinct army, is a serious threat to the
security, and the territorial integrity of the Kurdistan Region, as each
force can move forces independently of the other and without the
other’s knowledge. The PUK’s decision to withdraw forces from
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Kirkuk on 16 October 2017 in the face of an Iraqi central government
assault was a rational military decision, in that it prevented a bloody
clash that would have come with a hefty financial and human cost and
would most likely have ended in a defeat for the Peshmerga forces.
However, the divided military of the Kurdistan Region meant that in
the aftermath, that decision became completely a partisan issue. For the
KDP, the fall of Kirkuk cannot be described as anything but a betrayal.
If the Kurdish Peshmerga does not unite under a national military
force, then it is likely that the deep partisan divide in the Kurdistan
Region will persist. This will certainly weaken the KRG’s position vis-
à-vis Baghdad.
However, it should be said that relations between the Iraqi state and the
KRG have nearly become normalised following the loss of the disputed
areas, with the latter working to soothe the Iraqi government and neigh-
bouring states. The silence of the international community towards the
Iraqi attack on the disputed areas forced the Kurds to return to
Baghdad and peacefully struggle within the context of the Iraqi consti-
tution to achieve its constitutional goals, rather than attempting secession.
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